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Abstract
In 2002, the Finnish government introduced an earnings disregard reform aimed at im-
proving the incentives of low-income individuals who receive last-resort social assistance.
The aim of the reform was to decrease unemployment by providing social assistance
clients better incentives to receive at least temporary or part-time work. This paper
evaluates the employment effects of the reform using a quasi-experimental design. Af-
ter a behavioral adjustment period, there are positive results for females, single-person
households and individuals with earnings. No effects on the extensive margin imply that
a behavioural response requires some attachment to the labour market. No transition
from social assistance to longer-term employment is observed.
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Tiivistelmä
Tutkimuksessa tarkastellaan kvasikokeellisin menetelmin vuonna 2002 voimaan tulleen
toimeentulotuen etuoikeutetun tulon työllisyysvaikutuksia. Etuoikeutettuna tulona
jätetään huomiotta vähintään 20 prosenttia ansiotuloista. Kotitalouskohtainen mak-
simäärä oli aluksi 100 euroa kuukaudessa, joka korotettiin 150 euroon vuonna 2005.
Tarkastalteltava ajanjakso kattaa vuodet 2002-2005. Tutkimuksen aineistona käytetään
Tilastokeskuksen rekisteriainestoa.
Tutkimuksessa havaitaan tilastollisesti merkitseviä vaikutuksia naisille, yksinasuville ja
työtuloja saaville toimeentulotukiasiakkaille. Vuosiansiossa reformin vaikutus tuloihin oli
noin 200 euroa, 250 euroa ja 300 euroa vastaavasti ryhmittäin. Lyhytaikaista toimeentu-
lotuen saantia ei ole pääsääntöisesti huomioitu. Tulosten mukaan etuoikeutetulla tulolla
ei ollut juurikaan vaikutuksia työmarkkina-aseman muutoksiin. Pääasialliset vaikutuk-
set olivat jo työmarkkinoilla olevien ansiotuloihin. Reformi ei kasvattanut työmarkki-
noille osallistuvien määrää eikä sillä ollut vaikutusta siirtymiin toimeentulotuesta pidem-
piaikaiseeen työllistymiseen.
Tutkimusasetelma ei mahdollista niiden toimeentulotukiasikkaiden havaitsemista, jotka
tosiasissa saivat etuoikeutettua tuloa. Keskimääräiset tulokset toimeentulotukiasiakkaille
ovat kuitenkin politiikkarelevantteja, sillä etuoikeutettua tuloa ei voida kohdentaa tiety-
ille ryhmille. Riippuen toimeentulotukiasiakkaan olosuhteista, uudistuksen positiiviset
vaikutukset voivat kuitenkin olla estimoituja suuremmat.
Asiasanat: Toimeentulotuki, etuoikeutettu tulo, tulonsiirtojärjestelmä, kannustavuus
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1 Introduction
Making work pay policies have been introduced to improve financial incentives to accept
work and alleviate poverty. These aims are vital within social transfer systems that
impose high marginal taxes on low-income individuals. While in-work benefits are often
implemented through tax credits, earnings disregards function within a social transfer
system1. They imply that benefits are withdrawn less than in a one-for-one ratio when
a recipient starts to earn income.
In 2002, a three-year experiment – nowadays a permanent policy – was introduced
allowing a monthly earned income disregard up to e100. In 2005, the maximum amount
was increased to e150. Before the reform, social assistance was reduced one-for-one when
a recipient started to earn income. The reform is effectively equivalent to reduced tax
rates, consequently leading to an increase in the effective wage rate. Standard economics
theory would predict a higher labour supply for low-income individuals.
The purpose of this paper is to evaluate the Finnish earnings disregard reform using
a quasi-experimental design. This evaluation is based on high-quality individual-level
administrative data that covers the years 1995-2007. While many of the in-work benefit
programs are targeted at specific demographic groups such as working families or single
mothers, the Finnish experiment was targeted at all social assistance clients without ad-
ditional eligibility conditions. Since everyone receiving social assistance was eligible, it is
feasible to compare labour supply responses across many demographic groups. The em-
pirical strategy employs a difference-in-differences propensity score matching approach.
Means-tested unemployment benefit recipients form a valid control group to evaluate the
employments effects in a credible way.
This study is motivated by several factors. First, the maximum e150 monthly income
increase can be highly significant for individuals living under the poverty line. Second,
last resort-social assistance recipients are a substantial and policy relevant group for its
high rate of unemployment and social exclusion. For example in 2002, when the policy
was introduced, 8.3% of the population received last resort social assistance. Last, quasi-
experimental labour supply evidence from tax or benefit reforms in particular related to
making work pay policies is very limited in Nordic countries2.
Results estimated using both matching and regression techniques indicate the earnings
disregard reform had positive effects on earnings. It allowed social assistance clients to
earn a small temporary income to supplement their disposable income. The results are
group dependent. After a behavioural adjustment period, there are statistically signifi-
cant results for females, single-person households and individuals with earned income.
This paper is organized in the following way. The next section introduces related
literature and contributions. The third section explores the social security system in
Finland and provides details on the reform. The fourth section describes the empirical
1A substantial body of literature has studied labour supply effects of in-work benefits and related
policies. See for example Immervoll and Pearson (2009) and Card et al. (2010)
2Edmark et al. (2012) evaluate the Swedish earned income tax credit, but they conclude that the reform
cannot be evaluated a using quasi-experimental design. Bastani et al. (2016) estimate participation
responses using a housing allowance reform in Sweden.
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strategy and the data. The fifth section provides the results and discusses the validity of
the estimations, and the last section concludes.
2 Related Literature
International in-work benefits are widely used and researched. More than half of the
OECD countries have implemented an in-work benefit (Immervoll & Pearson, 2009).
Most of the research has focused on the earned income tax credit (EITC) in the United
States and its close counterpart in the United Kingdom. The EITC is a refundable tax
credit for low-income families with qualifying children. A broad consensus is that the
EITC has increased the labour supply at the extensive margin but not at the intensive
margin (Eissa & Liebman, 1996; Eissa & Hoynes, 2004; Hotz & Scholz, 2006). For
example, Nichols and Rothstein (2015) review the literature on the EITC.
The British Working Families’ Tax Credit (WFTC) was introduced in 1999. In contrast
to the EITC, the British tax credit has a minimum 16 hours of work a week condition and
no phase-in region. Francesconi and Van der Klaauw (2007) find a large seven percentage
point increase in single mothers’ employment rate. Blundell, Brewer, and Shephard
(2005) find that the WFTC and related reforms increased single parents’ employment
by around 3.6 percentage points. Since other reforms were introduced at the same time
as the WFTC, several other studies use a structural model. For example, Brewer et al.
(2007) find that the reform increased the labour supply of single mothers by around 5.1
percentage points.
The EITC and its British counterpart work through the tax system. Some studies
have found substantial behavioural effects on labour supply for welfare recipients. The
Canadian Self-Sufficiency Project was designed to provide evidence of the effects of a gen-
erous financial incentive on long-term welfare recipients. One third of the single-parent
welfare recipients began to work full-time (at least 30 hours a week), but the tempo-
rary program did not have a lasting effect on wages or receiving welfare (Michalopoulos,
Robins, & Card, 2005). Lemieux and Milligan (2008) provide labour supply evidence
from a negative incentive effect. In Quebec, social assistance recipients under the age of
30 without children received benefits 60% lower than the recipients older than 30. Using
regression discontinuity, the authors find that the employment rate dropped from three
to five percentage points after the increase in social assistance payments.
Others have studied income disregard policies implemented through the social transfer
system. Knoef and Van Ours (2016) study an earnings disregard experiment for single
mothers in Holland. In the Dutch experiment, single mothers were allowed to earn e4
per hour up to e120 in a month without having it deducted from their welfare benefits.
They find a positive employment effect for immigrants but a small effect for native
single mothers. Matsudaira and Blank (2014) evaluate changes in earnings disregards
for U.S welfare recipients following a welfare reform in 1996. Although some states
introduced large earnings disregards, they find find little evidence on increased labour
supply because only few women used the earning disregards. These results imply that
the labour supply effect may be a different depending on whether the in-work benefit is
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implemented through the tax or social transfer system.
This paper contributes to the earlier literature in two ways. First, since everyone re-
ceiving social assistance was eligible, labour supply responses can be compared across
many demographic groups. Previous literature has typically focused on narrow demo-
graphic groups, such as single mothers or families with dependent children. Second, the
literature is mainly focused on the USA and the UK with relatively low benefits and high
incentives. Finland is representative of a Nordic country with low incentives and high
benefits.
3 Background
3.1 Social Assistance in Finland
According to the constitution of Finland, everyone is entitled to basic income and care
necessary for a dignified life. Social assistance is meant to provide this last-resort mini-
mum level of income. It is means-tested at the family level and generally granted on a
monthly bases. Social assistance is meant to be temporary and secondary in the sense
that it comes on the top of other primary benefits such as housing allowance and labour
market subsidy. However, primary benefits have become increasingly insufficient to cover
individuals’ and families’ living expenses causing overlap with last-resort social assistance.
A deep recession in the beginning of the 1990s increased the number of social assis-
tance clients. The share of individuals receiving social assistance nearly doubled from
6.3% to 11.9% between 1990 and 1996. Both poverty, at wide range of measures, and
inequality rose after the recession (Riihelä, 2009). After 1996 the share of individuals
receiving social assistance started to decline until the financial crisis in 2008. However,
long-term dependency on social assistance has increased and average length of social
assistance reached six months in 2010 (Kuivalainen, 2013, 40). In an effort to decrease
the number of people receiving social assistance and long-term unemployment, activation
policy emphasizing individual responsibility has become the guiding policy - the earnings
disregard reform being one example.
3.2 Eligibility for Social Assistance
All individuals living in Finland are entitled to receive social assistance. Eligibility and
entitlement amounts can be described by a simple formula:
SA = max[0; (B +A+H)− (Y )], (1)
where B describes the basic part of social assistance. The basic part is meant to cover
food, clothing, phone, transportation, TV, internet, basic health and small costs for
hobbies and leisure. In 2017, this minimum level of basic income was e487.89 a month for
an individual who lives alone. The basic part is a function of household composition. H
describes necessary housing expenses and covers, for example, acceptable rent, electricity
and heating. A describes discretionary expenses that can be covered with supplementary
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and preventive social assistance. They are meant to support social assistance clients’
independent living. Supplementary social assistance covers extraordinary expenses, such
as sudden housing costs or expenses related to parenting. Preventive social assistance
can be granted to ease sudden adverse changes in finances.
Y describes family members’ summed earned income and primary benefits. Y includes
earned income and assets that are easily liquidated and not necessary for basic living or
work. Y also includes primary benefits, such as child benefit, labour market subsidy and
housing allowance. The labour market subsidy and the housing allowance are means-
tested3. Because multiple benefits are means-tested and extra benefits can be collected
back at a later stage, it is often difficult to know how extra earnings affect disposable
income creating income uncertainty. If the family members’ summed income in equation
1 is smaller than acceptable expenses, an applicant is entitled to social assistance.
3.3 Set up of the Experiment
The earnings disregard experiment became effective in April 2002. It started as a three-
year experiment but later became a permanent policy. It allows social assistance clients
to keep at least 20% of their earned income up to e100 (e150 in 2005) a month without
having it deducted from their social assistance payments. The experiment was household
specific so that one household was entitled to only one maximum e150 amount disre-
garded irrespective of the number of earners in a household. This creates relatively a
larger incentive effect for small households. The aim of the experiment was to decrease
unemployment by providing social assistance clients incentives to take at least temporary
or part-time work. Ideally, the goal of the reform can be summarized as a three-stage
model (Hiilamo, Karjalainen, Kautto, & Parpo, 2004, 68):
• In the first stage, a social assistance client has no earned income or very little.w
• In the second stage, the reform provides incentives for extra income. The new
income stays at a level at which the social assistance client is entitled to the disre-
garded earnings amount but does not lose his or her social assistance.w
• In the third stage, the social assistance recipient is attached to the labour market
due to higher incentives and has no need or little need for social assistance.
The panel structure of the data allows to study the reform effects both at the sec-
ond and third stage. Figure 1 shows a stylized budget constraint without the earnings
3At the time of the reform, 50% of the earned income was disregarded from labour market subsidy.
The housing allowance equals 0,8*(min(max acceptable rent) - basic deductible) where the basic
deductible is a function summed family income and household size.
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disregard and with the disregard excluding other benefits. The budget constraints are
calculated for an individual who lives alone using the basic social assistance amount
(e378.54) in 20054. The vertical axis shows disposable income as a function of earned
income. The BC line indicates disposable income before the earnings disregard reform.
For a social assistance client with a low earning potential, it is not optimal to accept
irregular or temporary work. The BD and BEF lines present the budget constraints
after the earnings disregard reform is introduced.
The social assistance law allowed municipalities and social workers to decide the disre-
gard percentage between 20% and 100% they applied to earned income (at most e150).
The lines BD and BEF present the budget constraints at these extremes. When 20%
of the earned income is disregarded, the maximum monthly benefit from the reform is
e100, and after earning e478.54, an individual is no longer eligible for social assistance.
This indicates a small incentive effect at a very low income. On the CD line there may
be some individuals who decrease they work after the reform, but this case seems quite
trivial. The line BEF shows the budget constraint at the other extreme when 100% of
the earned income is disregarded. Here, it is optimal to work until point E - that is to
earn e150. For more than e150 in earngins, the marginal tax rate is 100%. An optimal
disregard percentage is found between these two extremes.
Figure 1: Budget constraints before and after the earnings disregard reform
 
At the time of the experiment, there was no uniform policy on how the earnings disre-
4The budget constraints do not take into account interactions from other social transfers and benefits.
The social assistance is dependent on the household type and housing costs which generally increase
the amount of social assistance.
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gard policy was implemented across different municipalities. Likely because of the high
volume of social assistance applications and due to cost reasons, in most municipalities
the computing systems were set to automatically disregard the minimum 20%. Still,
social workers used discretion in applying the disregard percentage5. Because it is not
known how much was disregarded, this is an intention-to-treat research setting.
4 Identification Strategy
4.1 Matching Combined with Difference-in-Differences
The goal of this paper is to causally evaluate the average effect of the earnings disregard
reform. Let Dit be a binary variable that defines the treatment eligibility status at year
t. D = 1 if social assistance has been received in period t + s, where s ∈ {1, 2, 3, ..., T}
indicates the treatment period in years. The outcome variable Y takes the form of earned
income or months worked.
In Rubin’s potential outcome framework, let Y 1it+s denote earned income or months
worked after the earnings disregard is introduced. Also, let Y 0it+s denote the unobserved
counterfactual outcome if person i had not been assigned to the treatment. The causal
effect of the earnings disregard for person i can be now defined as:
Y 1it+s − Y 0it+s, (2)
where the counterfactual term Y 0it+s is unobservable. Because neither the treated indi-
viduals are observable, the estimated average treatment effect is based on the eligibility
condition D. The average causal effect of the income disregard reform is defined as:
E{Yt+s|Dit = 1} − E{Yt+s|Dit = 0}, (3)
which provides a policy relevant outcome because a policy maker cannot assign the
treatment to a specific target group. The causal inference hinges on a credible estimation
of the counterfactual, which is the term E{Yit+s|Dit = 0} in equation 3. This is estimated
using labour market subsidy recipients who are a sufficiently similar group in terms of
characteristics to social assistance clients. The labour market subsidy is a means-tested
unemployment benefit provided by the government. More details on the selection of the
treatment group and its estimated counterfactual are provided in the next subsection.
Matching reduces the selection bias generated by the non-random experimental design
by using individuals in the treatment and control groups who are sufficiently similar in
5Kuivalainen et al. (2013, 193-195) interviewed 142 social workers in nine municipalities and asked how
they applied the earnings disregard. Based on the social workers’ interviews in 2012, 47% usually
disregarded 20% of the earned income, and 43% disregarded the maximum amount e150. Ten percent
disregarded between these extremes.
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their observable characteristics, X. Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) proposed how the
matching problem can be reduced into one-dimensional propensity score p(X). In this
study, the propensity score is defined as the conditional probability of receiving social
assistance. Compared to conventional regression methods, propensity score matching
avoids both extrapolating outside common support and specifying a functional form.
Matching can be combined with a difference-in-differences estimator in both cross-
sectional and panel contexts. Tbe panel context tends to yield a different selection
because receiving last-resort social assistance over many years implies more serious social
marginalization and likely unresponsiveness to the reform. Thus, the focus is on cross-
sectional estimation except when exiting social assistance is modelled. As the cross-
sectional context is used, a logistic model is used to estimate the propensity score for
each year:
Pr(SAit = 1) = F (Xit), (4)
where the vector, X, contains covariates such as education, household composition, the
type of housing and regional characteristics.
Difference-in-differences controls for time-invariant unobservable heterogeneity. Difference-
in-differences matching estimator is defined as:
ÂTE =
1
NTA
∑
i∈TA∩Sp
[
(Y Ait − Y Bit )− (
∑
j∈CA∩Sp
WijY
A
jt −
∑
j∈CB∩Sp
WijY
B
jt )
]
(5)
where the subscripts i and j denote an individual belonging to the treatment and control
groups respectively. The superscripts A and B denote time after and before the reform.
NTA is the sub-set of individuals in the treatment group after the reform who belong
to region of common support, Sp. Also, let T and C denote the set of individuals who
belong to the treatment and control groups respectively. The weightWij is used to match
individual j to individual i in the treatment group.
Two different matching methods are used that differ in the weights, Wij , they use
to match individuals in the control group. The nearest neighbour method involves the
risk of bad matches if the closest neighbour is far away. Radius caliper matching sets a
tolerance level for the propensity score distance and uses all comparison units within the
caliper6. The kernel-weighted estimator gives the highest weight to the individual with
propensity scores closest to the treated individual. Conventional regression methods are
also used to supplement the analyses. Different specifications are presented in the results
section.
6Literature suggests (e.g. Austin, 2011) using a caliper width of 0.20 or 0.25 of the standard deviation
of the propensity score, but estimations here suggest that a smaller caliper yields a better covariance
balance. A Caliper width 0.01 is used in all estimations.
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4.2 Data and Sample Selection
This evaluation uses rich individual-based panel data collected by Statistics of Finland.
The data set covers the years from 1995 to 2007, each year containing more than 500 000
observations with a variety of income as well as socio-demographic and regional charac-
teristics. The labour market outcomes are measured as one month worked and earned
income containing both wages and entrepreneurial income. At least 15 working days
counts for one worked month7. Due to data restrictions, months worked don’t include
entrepreneurs. Only ages 17-64 are included in the analysis to reflect primary working
age and individuals who are entitled to labour market subsidy (individuals younger than
17 are not eligible). All variables are measured at the yearly level.
Social assistance recipients are a heterogeneous group. Receiving social assistance can
be temporary, or it can become a long-term dependency. Because receiving social as-
sistance can be very temporary, individuals who have received social assistance above
the median are used as the treatment group. Similarly, individuals who have received
labour market subsidy above the median are used as the control group. Labour market
subsidy is a means-tested unemployment benefit paid to job seekers who are not enti-
tled to an earnings-related unemployment insurance. Furthermore, since the reform was
meant to improve the incentives of the unemployed and since there is a relatively large
share of individuals with substantial income, yearly income earners above e10 000 are
not selected. Using pooled data, individuals below the percentile corresponding to e10
000 are selected in the treatment and control groups. Wage indices are added to e10 000
using the year 2001 as the base year. To supplement the analyses the results are also
estimated for a higher income group. This group includes individuals with earnings up
to e20 000 plus wage indices. Table 1 shows summary statistics for the treatment and
control groups.
Based on table 1, there are clear observable differences between the treatment and
control groups. Social assistance clients are on average four to five years younger. The
treatment group has more single parents and individuals living in a rented apartment.
They tend to have lower education but higher earnings. A likely reason for the higher
earnings is the median condition. Individuals and households may receive social as-
sistance on temporary basis, but they receive it above the median because of a large
household size, for example. Individuals receiving labour market subsidy above median
are by definition longer-term unemployed. These raw differences imply that it is impor-
tant to control for observable characteristics. Still, the composition of the treatment and
control groups is fairly stable over time. For example, the proportion of females does
not change before and after the reform. The household and education composition stays
largely the same as well. Overall, there are no large changes in composition over time.
This increases confidence that the reform effect can be identified in a credible way.
7After year 2005, at least 16 working days count as one worked month. A day is counted a work day
irrespective of how many hours a person has worked.
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics
Pre-Reform Post-Reform
Treatment Control ∆ Treatment Control ∆
Earned income 1495 903 592 1446 883 563
Months unemployed 7.3 9.0 -1.7 6.8 8.8 -2.0
Age 35.4 39.7 -4.3 35.0 40.9 -5.5
Female 0.43 0.57 -0.14 0.43 0.57 -0.14
High Education 0.08 0.12 -0.04 0.07 0.13 -0.06
Middle Education 0.41 0.50 -0.09 0.40 0.49 -0.09
Low education 0.52 0.38 0.14 0.53 0.38 0.15
Married 0.25 0.42 -0.17 0.23 0.43 -0.20
Couple without children 0.10 0.20 -0.10 0.10 0.20 -0.10
Couple with children 0.33 0.52 -0.19 0.31 0.52 -0.21
Single parent 0.23 0.13 0.10 0.23 0.13 0.10
Lives alone 0.22 0.08 0.14 0.25 0.09 0.16
Rented apartment 0.76 0.41 0.35 0.80 0.44 0.36
Composition 0.58 0.42 0.16 0.59 0.41 0.18
No. of observations 15 753 11 242 14 395 10 099
Note: Pre-reform refers to the years 2000 and 2001. Post-reform refers to the years 2003 and 2004. The
reported values are averages.
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5 Results
5.1 Results for the Whole Sample
This section begins by presenting the results for all social assistance clients within the
selected sample and after that for two subgroups, females and individuals with earned
income. The first three columns present the results when the number of months em-
ployed are used as the outcome variable, and the last three columns in tables show the
results when yearly earnings are used as an outcome variable. In addition to radius and
kernel estimations, the tables show the results from OLS estimations with the following
specification:
Yigt = αg + γt +
4∑
τ=1
δτDgτ + βXigt + igt, (6)
where αg is a group fixed effect and γt is a year fixed effect. Dgτ is the treatment eligibility
variable, and Xigt is a vector of observable individual characteristics. The specification
in equation 6 allows the treatment effect to vary across different years after the reform.
Table 2 shows the results of the logit model that is used to estimate the propensity
score for the whole sample. Exactly the same specification is used in all estimations.
The dependent variable gets the value of one if social assistance has been received in a
given year. The covariance balance after radius calliper matching is presented in figure
2. To further improve the matching quality, five percent trimming has been used in all
matching estimations.
Table 3 shows the cross-sectional results for all social assistance clients within the
selected sample. The OLS estimations indicate a growing but not statistically- significant
effect on earned income after the reform was introduced. Neither matching nor OLS
estimations show statistically significant effects on the outcome variables. Among the
social assistance clients, there are those who are severely socially marginalized with a
weak or nonexisting labour market attachment because of long-term health issues, for
example. Thus, intent-to-treat estimations are likely to be smaller than the incentive
effects on those who were actually treated. It is expected that the results are higher for
specific sub-groups, such as individuals with an existing labour market attachment.
5.2 Sub-group Results
Table 4 shows the results for two sub-groups, females and for individuals with positive
earnings. Empirical labour supply literature typically finds that women are more re-
sponsive to financial incentives than men (e.g. Meghir & Phillips, 2010). The results
in table 5 show that there is a growing effect on females’ earned income after the re-
form was introduced. After an adjustment period, kernel and OLS estimations indicate
statistically significant, approximately e200 reform effect on earnings for the year 2005.
Matching estimations have less power, and radius caliper estimation indicates only a
weak statistically significant reform effect. None of the results show effects on months
worked.
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Table 2: Propensity score for the comparison year 2001
Dependent variable: Probability of receiving social assistance
Variable Coefficient Std.Err. P > z
Age -0.030 0.012 0.010
Age squared -0.000 0.000 0.663
Female -0.898 0.043 0.000
Married -0.043 0.052 0.399
High education Ref.
Middle education 0.088 0.072 0.223
Low education 0.584 0.073 0.000
Couple without children Ref.
Couple with children -0.503 0.075 0.000
Single parent 0.224 0.096 0.000
Lives alone 0.512 0.120 0.000
Rented apartment 0.723 0.078 0.000
Rent×Single parent 1.434 0.130 0.000
Rent×Lives alone 1.079 0.149 0.000
Rent×Couple with children 0.490 0.100 0.000
Regional dummies Yes
Number of observations 13 253
Treatment 7 723
Control 5 530
Pseudo R-square 0.197
LR chi2(15) 3546.44
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Figure 2: Covariance balance for the comparison year 2001
-50 0 50 100
Standardized % bias across covariates
Couple with children
Age
Age squared
Married
Rural areas
Female
Middle education
Midsized cities
Rent × Couple with children
Low education
Single parent
Lives alone
Rent × Single parent
Rent × Lives alone
Rent
Unmatched
Matched
Note: Mean bias before matching is 34.8 and after matching 2.4.
Median bias before matching is 37.3 and after matching 1.7.
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Table 3: Cross-sectional difference-in-differences results
Outcome: Months employed Earned income
Method: Radius Kernel OLS Radius Kernel OLS
t=1
ATE 0.2 0.2 0.0 64 59 42
Standard error (0.18) (0.19) (0.14) (61.41) (61.58) (48.50)
Observations 9 032 9 032 21 735 25 213 25 213 61 948
t=2
ATE 0.1 0.1 0.0 81 84 59
Standard error (0.19) (0.10) (0.15) (60.98) (65.46) (49.74)
Observations 8 897 8 897 21 735 24 966 24 966 61 948
t=3
ATE -0.1 -0.2 -0.2 94 85 72
Standard error (0.18) (0.20) (0.15) (59.00) (59.25) (58.44)
Observations 8 617 8 617 21 735 24 547 24 547 61 948
t=4
ATE 0.1 0.1 0.1 56 52 79
Standard error (0.18) (0.21) (0.15) (68.66) (67.01) (52.00)
Observations 8 618 8 618 21 735 11 153 11 153 61 948
Note:
(1) *Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
(2) t refers to the post-reform time in years (t=1 refers to the year 2002).
(3) Year 2001 is used as a comparison year.
(4) Standard errors are bootstrapped.
(5) Age, age squared, female, married low education, middle education, couple with children, single
parent, lives alone, rent and interactions with f rent and household types and regional dummies were
used as control variables in all estimations.
Individuals with positive earnings are the most likely beneficiaries of the reform. When
only these individuals are included, the reform effect is larger than it is in previous es-
timations. For the year 2005, the estimated earned income effect is e299 from the OLS
estimation. The scope of the results is similar in the radius and kernel estimations.
Again, the results indicate no effect on employment duration when measured as months
employed. Similar to the estimations for females, all estimations indicate a growing
effect on earned income in each post-reform year. This can indicate that there was a
behavioural adjustment period. Based on social workers’ interviews, social assistance
clients were not fully informed about the experiment at the beginning (Hiilamo et al.
2004, 142-143). In addition, social workers may not have fully utilized the earnings dis-
regard policy as a social work tool at the beginning of the experiment.
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Table 4: Sub-group Results
Outcome: Months employed Earned income
Method: Radius Kernel OLS Radius Kernel OLS
Females
t=1
ATE 0.0 -0.1 -0.2 50 65 31
Standard error (0.28) (0.28) (0.20) (100.47) (99.03) (70.02)
Observations 4 603 4 603 11 026 12 435 12 435 30 401
t=2
ATE -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 84 85 47
Standard error (0.26) (0.25) (0.21) (98.13) (97.84) (71.47)
Observations 4 599 4 599 11 026 12 431 12 431 30 401
t=3
ATE 0.1 0.1 0.0 140 159 93
Standard error (0.33) (0.32) (0.21) (91.63) (87.63)* (73.23)
Observations 4 440 4 440 11 026 12 094 12 094 30 401
t=4
ATE 0.1 0.1 0.3 205 227 179
Standard error (0.33) (0.32) (0.21) (112.98)* (106.23)** (76.50)**
Observations 4 445 4 445 11 026 11 870 11 870 30 401
Earned income>0
t=1
ATE 0.1 0.1 0.0 90 96 61
Standard error (0.18) (0.17) (0.14) (100.87) (99.93) (82.88)
Observations 8 731 8 731 21 031 10 489 10 489 24 880
t=2
ATE 0.2 0.2 0.0 155 166 141
Standard error (0.20) (0.20) (0.14) (110.41) (110.43) (86.25)
Observations 8 614 8 614 21 031 10 265 10 265 24 880
t=3
ATE -0.2 -0.2 -0.1 218 219 203
Standard error (0.20) (0.19) (0.15) (117.06)* (111.21)* (89.54)**
Observations 8 321 8 321 21 031 9 912 9 912 24 880
t=4
ATE 0.0 0.0 0.1 277 266 299
Standard error (0.17) (0.18) (0.14) (108.66)** (111.24)** (92.43)***
Observations 8 321 8 321 21 031 9 730 9 730 24 880
Note:
(1) *Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
(2) t refers to the post-reform time in years (t=1 refers to the year 2002).
(3) Year 2001 is used as a comparison year.
(4) Standard errors are bootstrapped.
(5) Age, age squared, female, married low education, middle education, couple with children, single
parent, lives alone, rent and interactions with rent and household types and regional dummies were
used as control variables in all estimations.
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Sub-group results for males and different household types are shown in table 5. Since
the common trend assumption may not hold for all household types, a linear trend is
added to the estimations. In addition, because certain household types, such as single
parents are more likely to receive social assistance than labour market subsidy, there are
fewer matches available. For these reasons, only the OLS results are presented in table
5. There are no statistically significant results for males or other household types except
for single-person households. For couples without children and single parents, standards
errors are larger for the reasons mentioned above. The estimated reform effect for singe-
person households is e250 after an adjustment period for the year 2005. This result is
expected as single-person households can benefit more from the earnings disregard re-
form since it was household specific. In addition, single-person households are better off
because extra earnings do not need to be shared within the household.
Table 5: Earned income for males and different household types
Sub-group: Male Couple
without
children
Couple
with
children
Single
parents
Lives
alone
t=1
ATE 30 199 15 -50 81
Standard error (54.36) (131.44) (75.89) (95.36) (78.92)
Observations 31 547 8 657 24 586 8 279 10 931
t=2
ATE 44 275 105 151 105
Standard error (58.36) (134.55)** (79.56) (113.35) (88.48)
Observations 31 547 8 657 24 586 8 279 10 931
t=3
ATE -23 109 99 75 179
Standard error (62.54) (138.87) (85.26) (132.46) (102.18)*
Observations 31 547 8 657 24 586 8 279 10 931
t=4
ATE -30 222 159 238 250
Standard error (68.84) (148.66) (91.76)* (156.66) (118.53)**
Observations 31 547 8 657 24 586 8 279 10 931
Note:
(1) *Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
(2) t refers to the post-reform time in years (t=1 refers to the year 2002).
(3) Year 2001 is used as a comparison year.
(4) Age, age squared, female, married, low education, middle education, couple with children, single
parent, lives alone, rent and interactions with of rent and household types and regional dummies were
used as control variables.
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5.3 Panel Estimation Results
Previous models did not allow exits from social assistance. It can be hypothesized that
at the first stage there is an increased incentive to accept temporary or part-time work.
At a later stage, individuals are more attached to the labour market and leave social
assistance. To test this hypothesis individuals are followed in two panels before and after
the reform. Each individual receives social assistance or labour market subsidy in the
first year allowing exits in the following time period. The hypothesis is tested with the
following model:
∆Yigt = αg + γ + δDg + βXigt + igt, (7)
where γ and Dg are dummy variables for the post-reform period. The median condition
is not used here because the common trends assumption appears to hold better with a
positive amount of social assistance. A similar condition is used for the control group.
As expected, without the median condition the control group has higher earnings now
(see figure 3).
Figure 3: Earned income in the panel before and after the reform
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The results for all social assistance clients are shown in table 6. The results are largest
for the year 2005 but only weakly statistically significant in the matching estimations.
The results from the OLS estimation indicates no statistically significant effects. The
sub-group results for females and for individuals with earned income tend to be larger,
but the results are not statistically significant. These results indicate no transition from
social assistance to longer-term employment.
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Table 6: Panel estimation results
Outcome: ∆ Months employed ∆ Earned income
Method: Radius Kernel OLS Radius Kernel OLS
t=1
ATE 0.1 0.1 0.0 24 37 -57
Standard error (0.18) (0.17) (0.14) (86.66) (85.84) (62.87)
Observations 14 597 14 597 14 917 45 803 45 803 47 007
t=2
ATE 0.3 0.3 0.1 28 14 -68
Standard error (0.26) (0.24) (0.18) (92.41) (89.11) (69.55)
Observations 10 609 10 609 11 790 44 083 44 083 45 238
t=3
ATE 0.0 0.0 -0.1 195 179 117
Standard error (0.22) (0.21) (0.16) (103.60)* (102.43)* (73.38)
Observations 17 477 17 477 17 887 42 618 42 618 43 711
Note:
(1) *Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
(2) t=1 compares the panels 2000-2001 and 2002-2003; t=2 compares the panels 1999-2001 and
2002-2004; t=3 compares the panels 1998-2001 and 2002-2005.
(4) Standard errors are bootstrapped.
(5) Age, age squared, female, marriage, low education, middle education, couple with children, single
parent, lives alone, rent and interactions with of rent and household type and regional dummies were
used as control variables in all estimations.
19
5.4 Other Specifications
To further study the reform effect two other specifications are modelled – higher income
and extensive margin. Table A1 in appendix shows the results for the higher income
group. This group includes individuals whose earned yearly income is less than e20 000
plus wage indices using the year 2001 as the base year. The results are smaller and not
statistically significant except for individuals who live alone. For females and individuals
with positive earnings, there is a growing effect on earned income over time, but the
reform effect is non-significant and smaller than in the lower income group.
One reason for this result is that the individuals in the higher income group are more
likely to leave social assistance once they start working. The smaller income group is
more dependent on social assistance and can potentially benefit more from the reform.
Furthermore, micro-simulated budget constraints for example households reveal that the
reform did not remove the income trap but moved it to a higher income level implying
that the incentive effect is lower at a higher income level (Parpo, 2006). For example,
single parents are in an income trap with earned income between 900-1200 euros (Parpo
2006, 49). These income traps are formed because the earnings disregard ends at e150
(with 20% disregarded) and because of interactions effects from other benefits and taxes.
In order to study the effects at the extensive margin, the following linear probability
model is estimated:
P (Work)igt = αg + γt +
4∑
τ=1
δτDgτ + βXigt + igt, (8)
where P (Work) is defined to take a value of one if an individual has earnings and
otherwise 0. The results are shown in table 2A in appendix. None of the sub-groups
that were responsive to the reform in previous estimations show significant results at the
extensive margin. No effects at the extensive margin imply that some attachment to the
labour market is required. Note that this intensive margin result with individuals with
positive income does not imply that some individuals were working on the BD-line in
figure 2, when the marginal tax rate was 100%. This is because yearly data is used and
it is likely that these individuals were not social assistance clients when they worked8.
5.5 Threats to Identification
The main identifying assumption is the common trends. Figure 4 show the common
trends before selection on observables and after balancing the observables. The graphs
indicate that the common trends assumption seems to hold. The treatment and control
groups respond to economic shocks in a similar way. In addition, the graphs indicate
only minor changes after propensity score matching. This supports the identification as
8In addition, a negligible amount of earnings and gifts was already disregarded before and after the
reform. This amount was generally e50, but the practice varied across municipalities.
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it implies that observable differences do not significantly affect the results. Both radius
caliper and kernel matching yield similar graphs.
Figure 4: Common trends
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The stable unit treatment value assumption (SUTVA) implies no spillover effects and
stable composition over time. At the individual level, spill over effects cannot be fully
ruled out9. If a social assistance client becomes employed because of the reform, the
spouse receiving labour market subsidy would have fewer financial incentives to find
work if income is shared within the household. This tends to increase the reform effect.
The reform effect could vary depending on the selection of the control group and its
institutional context. Still, the reform effect is fairly modest and focused on temporary
work implying that the earnings disregard reform does not significantly affect a spouse’s
incentives.
Based on table 1, the composition remains fairly stable across demographic groups and
over the treatment and control groups. Anticipation effects may also affect composition,
but the effects are likely to be negligible. Bargain, Immervoll, and Viitamäki (2012)
studied the non-take-up rate of social assistance benefits using Finnish data and found a
substantial non-take-up rate, between 40% and 50%. Given the complexity of the Finnish
social security system, it seems unlikely that these individuals are rational calculators
who try to benefit the maximum amount from social transfers. Finally, there may be
confounding factors from other reforms. No other major reform was introduced after the
earnings disregard reform became effective (see table A3 in appendix).
9The estimations could be done at household level, but this would significantly reduce the sample size
and limit sub-group analyses.
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There are also other pieces of evidence that indicate relatively clean identification.
First, labour supply literature typically finds that females are more responsive to finan-
cial incentives than males. Second, social assistance clients with positive earnings are
the most likely beneficiaries of the reform. Similarly, it is expected that single-person
households are likely beneficiaries of the reform. The results indicate the largest effects
for these groups. Finally, there is timing evidence. The results are the largest and most
statistically significant for the year 2005 when the maximum disregarded amount was
increased to e150.
6 Conclusions
This paper examines the employment effects of the Finnish earnings disregard reform
for the years 2002-2005. After a behavioural adjustment period, there are statistically
significant results for females, single-person households and individuals with earned in-
come. The implied elasticities are 0.11, 0.14 and 0.16 respectively using the maximum
e150 monthly earnings disregard. These elasticities are likely to underestimate the true
effect because many municipalities disregarded 20% of the earned income.
The earnings disregard policy allowed social assistance clients to earn small temporal
income to supplement their disposable income. Still, there are few changes in the labour
market status. No effects on the extensive margin imply that a behavioural response
requires some attachment to the labour market. In addition, the panel estimations show
no transitions from social assistance to long-term employment. Although the incentive
effect is fairly modest, the earnings disregard has many positive aspects.
The earnings disregard reform unambiguously improved social assistance clients’ sit-
uation with limited fiscal implications. Before the reform social assistance was effec-
tively reduced in one-to-one ratio after a recipient started to earn income. Depending
on individual circumstances, the incentive effect on the treated can be larger than the
intention-to-treat estimations show. However, from a policy perspective there are fac-
tors that weaken the effectiveness of the reform. Applying the earnings disregard at the
individual level instead of the household level would likely give a higher incentive effect.
Also, the rules for applying the earnings disregard varied across municipalities. Simple
rules should be applied to earnings disregards so that it is easy to perceive how taking
up work affects disposable income. Interaction effects from other means-tested benefits
add complexity to the social security system making it more difficult to perceive how
temporary work affects disposable income.
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Appendix A
Table A1: Difference-in-differences results for the higher income group (e20 000)
Group: Whole sample Female Positive earnings Lives alone
Outcome: Months Income Months Income Months Income Months Income
t=1
ATE 0.1 -19 0.1 18 0.1 -52 0.1 170
Standard error (0.09) (67.66) (0.14) (98.00) (0.09) (112.23) (0.21) (115.81)
Observations 26 816 67 179 13 361 32 774 26 112 30 111 3 990 11 419
t=2
ATE 0.0 50 0.1 66 0.04 142 0.0 291
Standard error (0.10) (71.04) (0.17) (102.02) (0.10) (119.24) (0.26) (129.49)**
Observations 26 816 67 179 13 361 32 774 26 112 30 111 3 990 11 419
t=3
ATE -0.2 11 0.1 98 -0.2 150 -0.2 315
Standard error (0.12)* (75.24) (0.17) (109.25) (0.11) (128.19) (0.32) (143.75)**
Observations 26 816 67 179 13 361 32 774 26 112 30 111 3 990 11 419
t=4
ATE 0.0 -4 0.3 134 0.01 192 0.0 297
Standard error 0.13 (80.33) 0.19) (113.94) (0.11) (138.19) (0.38) (163.56)*
Observations 26 816 67 179 13 361 32 774 26 112 30 111 3 990 11 419
Note:
(1) *Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
(2) t refers to the post-reform time in years (t=1 refers to the year 2002).
(3) Year 2001 is used as a comparison year.
(4) Age, age squared, female, married, low education, middle education, couple with children, single parent, alone living,
rent and interactions with rent and household types and regional dummies were as control variables in all estimations.
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Table A2: Results for the extensive margin
Group: Whole
sample
Female Male Couple
without
children
Couple
with
children
Single
parent
Lives
alone
t=1
ATE 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.05 0.01 0.01 -0.02
Standard error (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04)
Observations 61 948 30 401 31 547 8 657 24 586 11 592 10 931
t=2
ATE 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.06 0.01 0.00 0.00
Standard error (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03)** (0.02) (0.03) (0.04)
Observations 61 948 30 401 31 547 8 657 24 586 11 592 10 931
t=3
ATE 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.02 -0.03 0.03
Standard error (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04)
Observations 61 948 30 401 31 547 8 657 24 586 11 592 10 931
t=4
ATE 0.00 0.01 -0.01 0.04 0.02 -0.02 0.01
Standard error (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04)
Observations 61 948 30 401 31 547 8 657 24 586 11 592 10 931
Note:
(1) *Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
(2) t refers to the post-reform time in years (t=1 refers. to the year 2002).
(3) Year 2001 is used as a comparison year.
(4) Age, age squared, female, married, low education, middle education, couple with children, single parent, lives
alone, rent and interactions with rent and household types and regional dummies were used as control variables in all
estimations.
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Table A3: Main reforms between 1995 and 2007
Year Social assistance Labour market subsidy
1996 Possibility to cut social assis-
tance 20% for refusing to par-
ticipate in active labour market
programs
Under 20 years old is not eligible
without secondary education or
applying for it
1996 Under 25 years old is not eligible
without secondary education or
applying for it
1997 Individual employment plans
and personal interviews
1998
1999 Possibility to cut immigrants’
social assistance for refusing to
accept an integration plan
2001 Act on Rehabilitative Work Ac-
tivity introduced rehabilitating
measures and sanctions for the
long-term unemployed
Act on Rehabilitative Work Ac-
tivity introduced rehabilitating
measures and sanctions for the
long-term unemployed
2001 Applications handled immedi-
ately
2001 Responsibility to register with
an unemployment office
2001 Supplementary and preventive
social assistance
2002 Earned income disregard reform Reinforcing individual employ-
ment plans
2005 Maximum disregarded income
increased to e150
2006 7% own risk in housing expenses
removed
Municipalities are responsible
for half the benefit costs of the
long-term unemployed accom-
panied by new sanctions
2007
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